The amended "Constitutional Court Procedure Act" (the "Act") officially came into force on January 25, 2025. Since there are only eight incumbent Justices, the Constitutional Court is unable to conduct substantive deliberations on cases under the amended provisions, let alone render judgments.

As of now, while the Constitutional Court continues to conduct deliberations in form, it is actually only the reviewing panel’s preliminary determination of whether a case should be accepted. For cases that have been accepted, the Court, under the amended Act, is unable to proceed with substantive deliberations or issue rulings. In other words, the Constitutional Court’s constitutional role in checking executive and legislative power has been unilaterally paralyzed for a month. We do not know how long this situation will persist.

We must issue a warning: the Constitutional Court's inability to conduct deliberations and render judgments due to the amendment of the Act constitutes a serious "constitutional time bomb." If a significant constitutional dispute arises in the future but the Court remains unable to rule on it, this could trigger an even more severe constitutional crisis.

At present, the Constitutional Court has formally requested the Legislative Yuan to provide information and opinions in writing for the review of this case. In response, the Legislative Yuan further discussed the matter during an inter-party negotiation session yesterday afternoon (March 5). Given this situation, we call upon the Constitutional Court to issue a ruling suspending the application of the amended Act before the crisis arrives, based on the legal principle that the Constitution takes precedence over the Act.

1.It is the Constitutional Court's Duty to Check Legislative and Executive Power

As an independent watchdog that has long stood in opposition to the system, the Judicial Reform Foundation ("JRF") has consistently been more critical than supportive of the rulings and interpretations made by the Justices. In recent cases—such as the “Death Penalty Case,” the “Tier 1 Drug Trafficking Case,” the “Li-Shen Dai Whistleblower Dismissal Case,” and the "Guo-Yao Xu Dismissal Case"”—we have publicly criticized the Justices’ rulings, in the hope of pushing the judiciary toward greater progress.

However, regardless of the outcome of these rulings, out of respect for the judicial system, we will not recklessly question the Justices' neutrality without concrete evidence, nor will we arbitrarily accuse them of political bias toward any particular party. We are acutely aware that, as a key institution in the separation of powers and constitutional checks and balances, the credibility of the Constitutional Court must not be challenged without solid grounds.

Regrettably, the opposition parties have both paralyzed the Constitutional Court’s functions through legislative amendments and waged a public opinion campaign to undermine trust in the institution. Politicians have repeatedly misled the public with false narratives, as exemplified by the past six months of sensationalized claims such as "death row inmates will be released" or "eight hurdles to enforcing the death penalty". Even more concerning, following the Constitutional Court’s ruling that struck down most provisions of the opposition-led amendments expanding legislative power as unconstitutional, the opposition has aggressively labeled the Justices as biased, unfair, and serving the interests of the ruling party. However, at the same time, as many as 123 legal scholars have publicly urged the Legislative Yuan to withdraw and reconsider the five controversial legislative amendments—demonstrating that the Court’s position aligns with the prevailing view in the legal community. These attacks and distortions against the Constitutional Court in no way justify the legislature’s unilateral suspension of its constitutional functions.

We believe that the Kuomintang Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) have crossed the red line of the rule of law by both blocking all judicial nominees and amending the Act in an attempt to cripple the Constitutional Court. We believe that the opposition party’s motivation for amending the Act is not a genuine effort to reform the Constitutional Court, but rather an attempt to eliminate an institutional check on their legislative power. Regardless of one’s stance on past Constitutional Court rulings, we urge all society sectors to recognize a crucial principle: When faced with an unconstitutional act that unilaterally strips it of its constitutional authority, the Constitutional Court certainly has the right to defend itself by reviewing the amended Act that paralyzes its functions so as to fulfill its constitutional role in checking both legislative and executive power.

2.The Suspension of the Constitutional Court is a Ticking Time Bomb for Taiwan’s Constitutional Order

In fact, the paralysis of the Constitutional Court has already raised a red flag for Taiwan’s democratic legal foundation—though the crisis has yet to fully erupt. At present, even if the President, the Executive Yuan, or the Legislative Yuan engage in blatant unconstitutional actions or severe constitutional disputes arise between them, there is no institutional mechanism to resolve these conflicts. At this moment, the severity of the situation may not be immediately apparent, as the erosion of constitutional order is often a gradual process. However, once a constitutional crisis is triggered by further disputes and conflicts, it will become increasingly difficult to contain. Looking at the democratic backsliding in Hungary, Poland, and other Eastern European countries, we see that judicial power is always the first target of attack. As the judiciary crumbles, society inevitably faces the unchecked expansion and authoritarian dominance of executive and legislative powers.

We believe that the paralysis of the Constitutional Court is a ticking time bomb. We cannot wait until future crises erupt before scrambling for solutions. Instead, this issue must be addressed immediately to prevent it from becoming a flashpoint that, when combined with other major constitutional disputes, could ignite an uncontrollable crisis.

3.The Constitutional Court Has Not Yet Expressed Its Opinion on the Amendment to the Act

Cases challenging the constitutionality of the amended Act or requesting preliminary injunctions have already been submitted to the Constitutional Court. However, as of now, the court has not expressed any opinion on the matter.

We have observed that in cases currently under review by the Constitutional Court, some petitioners worry that the amended Act may negatively impact their case outcomes. As a result, they have submitted additional petitions specifically addressing the new law. However, in a ruling on February 10, three Justices (acting as the Review Panel) rejected one of these petitions, citing that it was filed past the deadline and that the original judgment did not apply the Act. According to the ruling, the Justices did not address any legal concerns regarding the Act’s amendments. However, on the other hand, the Constitutional Court has formally requested information and opinions from the Legislative Yuan as part of its review process.

Since the amendment to the Act directly concerns the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, the Justices should approach this legal issue, the procedural matters, and the review process with the utmost caution. While we respect the Constitutional Court’s procedural approach, we also expect the Justices to uphold their duty of safeguarding Taiwan’s constitutional order and to defuse the ticking time bomb created by the amended Act.

4.Supporting the Constitutional Court’s Self-Defense to Prevent the Destruction of Democratic Constitutionalism

It is encouraging that, so far, Taiwan's legal community and civil society have provided abundant support for this issue.

In a system of separation of powers, the judiciary has always been the most vulnerable branch—it lacks the direct public support enjoyed by the Legislative Yuan and does not possess the vast organizational and enforcement power of the Executive Yuan. Unlike the other two branches, the judiciary’s greatest strength lies in its ability to earn public acceptance, trust, and respect through rational reasoning and argumentation.

While politicians have the right to criticize or even disparage the judiciary as part of their freedom of speech, it constitutes a severe violation to constitutional order when they collectively and openly defy judicial rulings or even attempt to silence the judiciary through their political power. This is a warning sign that should not be ignored.

At present, some may feel that this issue is insignificant—that “it doesn’t matter whether the Constitutional Court functions or not.” However, in reality, this situation has already planted the seeds of a greater constitutional crisis. We do not wish to see a day when the constitutional time bomb of the paralysis of the Constitutional Court detonates along with other crises, causing people to finally realize: "How did our democracy deteriorate to this point? Could it have been prevented?"

We urge all sectors of society to support the Constitutional Court in defending itself and to prevent the collapse of the checks and balances that safeguard our democratic constitutional system.